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THE COURT OF APPEALS, 1953 TERM
is incident to occupation and control. 7 Whether 28control by the
present is a question of fact for the jury.
lessor is.
In Dick v. Sunbright Steam Laundry, 9 the lessee of a building was sued by an adjoining property owner on the ground
that waste water was seeping into his premises as a result of
the careless operation of laundry machinery by reason of defective plumbing. The lessee impleaded the lessor who had
covenanted to repair. Control of the premises by the lessor was
alleged in general terms in the third-party complaint. A motion
by the lessor to dismiss the third-party complaint for failure to
state a cause of action was denied by the trial court. The Court
of Appeals reversed by a 4-3 vote.
Judge Dye, writing for the majority, stressed the fact that
the third-party complaint contained no allegation that the landlord had retained the right to re-enter to make repairs or that he
had ever done so. This alone seems to be insufficient grounds for
a dismissal since the lessee did allege the landlord's control, and
the issue of control being a jury question, the allegation of the
ultimate fact should be sufficient.3"
Whatever the merits of the draftsmanship of the third-party
complaint may be, the decision of the majority appears to be
justified under the existing law for another reason. This is that
a third-party may be impleaded only when he is or may be liable
to the original defendant for all or part of the original plaintiff's claim. 31 In this case the original complaint appears ta
have alleged only active negligence on the part of the original
defendant. Since one who is actively negligent cannot recover
over from a joint tortfeasor, 2 and technically the defendant
should be held liable only on a finding of active negligence, the
third-party could not be liable to the original defendant for any
recovery against it in this case. 3
Suit Against UnincorporatedAssociations
For purposes of suit the General Associations Law defines
an unincorporated association as: "Any partnership or other
27. Klepper v. Seymour House Corp., 246 N. Y. 85, 158 N. E. 29 (1927).
28. Scudero v. Campbell, 288 N. Y. 328, 43 N. E. 2d 338 (1942); Antonsen v. Bay
Ridge Savings Bank, 292 N. Y. 143, 54 N. E. 2d 338 (1944).
29. 307 N. Y. 422, 121 N. E. 2d 399 (1954).
30. Cf. California Packing Corp. v. Kelly Storage & Distributing Co., 228 N.'Y.
44, 126 N. E. 269 (1920).
31. C. P. A. § 193-a.
32. Fox v. Western New York Motor Lines Inc., 257 N. Y. 305, 178 N. E. 289
(1931).
33. Bonus Indemnity Insurance Co. v. Cruise, 277 App. Div. 1118, 100 N. Y. S.
2d 876 (2d Dep't 1950).
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company of persons, which has a president or a treasurer
,,14 An action may be maintained against an unincorporated association by proceeding against such president or
treasurer. 5 No action, based on the liability of the association,
may be brought against individual members until a judgment
against the whole group has been returned unsatisfied."'
In a recent ease, suit to recover for legal services rendered
was brought against an unincorporated religious body. The association was composed of a General Church and a number of
episcopal districts. Both the General Church and the districts
had presiding officers. The trial court found that the plaintiff
had been employed by the First Episcopal District and that this
employment was ratified by the officers of the General Church.
Judgment was entered against the presiding officer of the First
Episcopal District. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that
no judgment could be entered against the District until a final7
judgment against the General Church was returned unsatisfied.'
The trial court had obviously treated the District as an association in its own right, -while the Court of Appeals regarded it as
a member of the General Church.
It is not clear whether the finding of ratification by the officers of the General Church was a prerequisite to the plaintiff's
recovery. Since the trial court did find such ratification, and
thereby placed primary liability on the General Church, the entry
of judgment against the officer of the District seems inconsistent,
and the reversal by the Court of Appeals sound.
Res Judicata
Plaintiffs had brought suit alleging alternative claims in contract and unjust enrichment. In each claim the prayer was for
damages only. Judgment was rendered for the defendants as
to both. 38 Plaintiffs subsequently brought suit for the return
of stock transferred to the defendants in the transaction sued
upon in the previous action. The Court of Appeals held that
inasmuch as an action for restitution can be maintained only when
there has been unjust enrichment,3 9 the40 first action was res judicata and a complete bar to the second.
34. GENERAL ASSOCIATIONS LAW § 13.
35. Ibid.
36. Id. § 16.
37. Flagg v. Nichols, 307 N. Y. 96, 120 N. E. 2d 513 (1954).
38. Slater v. Gulf, Mobile & Ohio R. Co., 279 App. Div. 166, 108 N. Y. S. 2d
145 (1st Dep't 1951), aff'd 304 N. Y. 636, 107 N. E. 2d 163 (1952).
39. Milman v. Denniston, 271 App. Div. 988, 68 N. Y. S. 2d 325 (2d Dep't), leave
to appeal denied, 297 N. Y. 1038, 74 N. E. 2d 869 (1947).
40. Slater v. Gulf, Mobile & Ohio R. Co., 307 N. Y. 419, 121 N. E. 2d 398 (1954).

